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revelation construed as a fonn of manifestation; thereby he deftly responds to
the claims of philosophers like Locke and Flew who have argued that revelation
presupposes some fonn of natural theology or its functional equivalent.
When at last we arrive at the communication model we are ready for it. The
basic issue pursued is that of construing divine revelation as analogous to a
situation where one person speaks to another person. Here Mavrodes takes up
such topics as the place of propositions and promises in revelation, the place of
a priori judgement in construing the content and media of revelation, the person-relative character of revelation, and the place of mediation in the transmission of revelation. The least convincing section of the whole book is a final
section where he attempts to analyse a lengthy autobiographical claim of the late
John Baillie, in which Baillie says that God had spoken to him through the
narrative traditions of Israel, the church, and his own family.
Theologians are wont to complain that when philosophers write about divine revelation they invariably assume an uninformed and untenable reading
of the biblical traditions, fuelled perhaps by their exposure to or engagement
in conservative versions of the Christian faith. This is a legitimate complaint,
and those who are looking for evidence of this charge will find some here,
especially in chapter four. However, it would be otiose to make much of this
complaint. The task that Mavrodes has set himself here does not depend upon
this or that reading of the biblical texts. Nor are his arguments overturned by
drawing attention to his theological pedigree. In fact his can dour on the latter is
refreshingly stated, and it in no way stifles his clarity or creativity. The great
merit of this whole discussion is that it helps reopen a conversation on the
concept of divine revelation which is long overdue. Mavrodes is at once restrained, candid, suggestive, rigorous, and illuminating. For example, the schemata deployed in chapter three to unveil the concept of revelation is a
masterpiece of lucidity. Moreover, there are suggestive insights scattered
throughout this volume which deserve extensive pondering. There is one astonishing lacuna. The idea of incarnation is mentioned only obliquely. It is passing
strange that a philosopher of Mavrodes' skill and theological propensity can
write a whole book on divine revelation without dealing at length with the place
of divine incarnation in the logic of revelation. It is also surprising that there is
no extended treatment of the relation between tradition and revelation, although
the final section strays into the neighbourhood of this topic.

The Ocean o/Truth: A Defence a/Objective Theism, by Brian Hebblethwaite.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. Pp. 165. $34.50 (cloth),
$11.95 (paper).
Reviewed by CLEMENT OGRE, Vanderbilt University.
The following quote (from pages 146-47) may appear to be a summation of
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many of the grounds which the author has offered for the belief that God
exists:
An absolute, infinite, self-existing mind alone explains the contingency and
yet the intelligibility of the universe. A personal will or intention alone
explains the kind of order which the universe possesses [and] its capacity to
evolve finite minds and the find tuning of its initial conditions, if ever that
capacity was to be realised. A supremely good and beautiful ultimate reality
behind all finite forms of existence alone explains the values we perceive on
earth in such partial, temporary and fragile ways ... [it explains], too, man's
religious sense, his openness to the transcendent. ... And of course the reality
and activity of God constitute the best explanation of the traditions of faith
based on spiritual revelation."

But in fact this is more than a mere summation of the author's defense of
theism. None of his original arguments, though they are expressed less succinctly, are much more rigorous than are the inferences contained in the
quote, with the exception of the argument from "fine tuning" -the argument
that contemporary big bang theory entails that, even given that some kind of
universe would have resulted from some kind of big bang, the odds against
there having been precisely the big bang which eventually gave rise to intelligent life, were astonishingly great. But none of the other arguments is in
fact anything like as rigorous as, say, recent defenses of the ontological
argument. And, even if the "fine tuning" argument is sound, it surely does
not rigorously establish the existence of a supremely perfect being.
The author might wish to reply here that he is giving the best explanations
which are available to us of the phenomena cited in the quote, and that, as a
consequence, we should accept those explanations, regardless of the degree
of rigor involved. It is, of course, the case that some explanations (say,
"Possession by the devil accounts for her strange behaviour") are unacceptable, even if they are the best explanations available at a given time. But
aren't the author's explanations such that reasonable people can disagree
about their epistemic merit? (The author appears to think that they are more
convincing than that. But here, I think, he is mistaken.)
An argument on behalf of a negative answer to the above question is as
follows: "Since simplicity and predictive fruitfulness are criteria of a best
explanation, the hypothesis that a demon, bent on deceiving us into believing
falsely that theism is true, has as much epistemic merit as does the author's
theistic explanations. It is, of course, the case that we are warranted in rejecting demon explanations vis-a-vis rival scientific explanations, but this is
because the latter are more predictively-fruitful-cum-simple than the former,
and, anyway, they do not posit intelligent beings as the ultimate source of
what they explain, as do the author's explanations. It won't do for the author
to object here that the demon explanation is inferior because a) it gives rise
to an unanswerable question, viz., 'What motivates the demon to deceive us?'
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and b) we can answer the question, "What motivates God to create beauty,
etc." simply by pointing out that God is perfectly good. For an equally
plausible answer to the former question is available, namely, that the demon
is thoroughly evil and, hence, is the ultimate cause of all false beliefs (and,
perhaps, of suffering as well)."
However, if each of the two alternative explanations do in fact have some
epistemic merit, then Jamesean prudence dictates that at least many of us
should, for peace of mind, accept theism and reject the demon hypothesis.
Still, I think it unwise of the author to make (on page 143) the following,
very strong claim about Alvin Plantinga's recent theistic epistemology:
... although belief in God may well be [properly?] basic in many peoples'
belief systems, in the sense that, simply as a matter of fact, it is not for them
the result of rational argument, it still remains vulnerable if denied rational
support. It is too contentious a belief in the modern post-Enlightenment
world ...

For in so doing the author precludes his falling back on the Plantingaean
thesis that phenomena such as religious experiences relate to belief in God,
not as explicanda to best explicans, but as conditions of theistic belief which
theists can properly take to be good reasons for theism, even though non-theists may not violate any epistemic duties in not so construing them. And I
suspect that many epistemologists will think that Plantinga' s weaker thesis
is more plausible than the author's stronger one.
Nonetheless, he has given us an informative and thought-provoking book
and one which I think accomplishes its chief aim of disproving the claim that
well educated, modern Christians will, upon reflection, reject theism. (I
should add that many of the articles in this journal show very clearly that the
envisaged claim is false.)

